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This paper examines the impact of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) on domestic investment by 
applying co-integration techniques to macroeconomic time series data for the United Sates and Germany. We show 
that the two countries differ: In the case of the US, OFDI has positive long-run effects on domestic investment while 
in the case of Germany the reverse effect is reported.  
 
JEL classification: F21, E22, F41 
Keywords : Foreign Direct Investment, Investment, Open Economy Macroeconomics 
 




There is an ongoing debate on whether or not outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) 
influences domestic investment activities. One strand of the literature argues that OFDI 
substitutes domestic investment either by shifting production abroad or because investing scarce 
financial resources abroad inevitably reduces the likelihood of concurrent investments at home 
(e.g., Stevens and Lipsey, 1992). In contrast, an alternative perspective suggests that greater 
foreign investment is associated with higher levels of domestic investment. According to this 
view, firms combine home production with foreign production to reduce costs and raise the 
returns to domestic production, which in turn increases domestic investment (e.g., Desai et al., 
2005). 
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence is inconclusive. For example, results by Stevens 
and Lipsey (1992) suggest that OFD and domestic investment by US multinationals are 
substitutes. According to a study by Belderbos (1992), the same holds for Dutch food and 
metal/electronic companies. In contrast, a recent study by Desai et al. (2005) finds a positive 
relationship between domestic and foreign investment by US firms. Admittedly, given that these 
studies are focussed on analyzing a limited number of large multinational firms, they do not 
indicate the overall effect on domestic investment when all (large, small and medium-sized) 
enterprises increase their OFDI. 
To date, however, the macroeconomic relationship between OFDI and domestic 
investment has hardly been investigated. Two exceptions are the studies by Feldstein (1994) and 
Desai et al. (2005), who, using aggregate cross country data, find that each Dollar of OFDI 
reduces total domestic investment by approximately one dollar. Nevertheless, a major problem is 
  3that cross-country studies implicitly assume similar economic structures across countries. In 
reality, however, production technologies, institutions, and policies differ substantially between 
countries. Consequently there is room for the assumption that the effects of OFDI on domestic 
investment may also differ from country to country. Moreover, contemporaneous correlation 
across countries does not imply causation, and thus these studies may suffer from serious 
endogeneity biases. 
Therefore, in this paper, we use a different approach to examine the impact of OFDI on 
domestic investment – namely, a co-integration and causality analysis on the basis of 
macroeconomic time series data for two important global players: the US and Germany.
1 
Important results of our study are: OFDI promotes domestic investment in the US, while in the 
case of Germany the reverse effect is found. In other words, country differences matter.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the estimating equation and the 
data. The estimation results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.  
 
 
2. Estimating equation and data 
  
In general, we take a comparable approach to Desai et al. (2005) by estimating the 


















3 2 1 ,                                                                                         (1) 
where I is domestic investment, Y  denotes gross domestic product (GDP), OFDI stands for 
outward direct investment, t is a linear time trend (t = 1, …, T), and  t ε  is the usual error term, 
which reflects the influence of all other factors. Here, we use gross capital formation to measure 
  4domestic investment. OFDI equals net FDI outflows. Data on capital formation as a percentage 
of GDP are drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2006. Data on 
 are from the UNCTAD FDI data base. The sample period is 1970-2003 for the 
United States, for Germany 1971-2004 (T = 34). 





3.1. Testing for cointegration 
In the first step, we test for the existence of a cointegrating relationship between OFDI 
and domestic investment by using the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach 
developed by Pesaran et al. (2001). This approach is applicable irrespective of whether the 
underlying variables are purely I(0), purely I(1) or mutually cointegrated, and thus avoids the 
problems inherent in pre-testing for unit roots prior to testing for cointegration. The error 

























































3 2 1 γ η .           (2)                            
 
 
Accordingly, the absence of a cointegrating relationship between   and  s  
tested by calculating the F-statistic for the null of no cointegration   against 
t Y I ) / ( t Y OFDI ) / ( i
: 0 H 0 4 3 2 = = = b b b
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 According to UNCTAD data, the US ranked at the top in terms of OFDI stocks in 2004, while Germany was at 
  5the alternative   0 . Because the F-statistics have a non-standard distribution 
and depend on whether the variables are I(0) or I(1), Perasan et al. (2001) provide two sets of 
critical values: one assumes that all variables are I(0), the other assumes that all variables are 
I(1). If the calculated F-statistic falls below the lower bound critical value, then the null of no 
cointegration cannot be rejected. If, in contrast, the F-statistic lies above the upper bound critical 
value, then the null hypothesis is rejected. If the F-statistic falls within the critical value bounds, 
the result is inconclusive.   
: 1 H 4 3 2 ≠ ≠ ≠ b b b
To determine whether a deterministic trend is required, we estimate equation (2) with and 
without t. It turns out that only for the US a trend is needed in equation (2). For Germany, the 
trend is not supported by the data and hence is excluded from the equation. Moreover, for the 
US, two impulse dummies, D75 and D84, are necessary to achieve a normal distribution of the 
residuals.  D75 captures the effects of the recession in 1974-75, and D84 accounts for fast 
economic recovery in 1984 after the 1982-83 recession. For Germany, an impulse dummy 
variable, D79, is included in order to control for the business cycle peak in 1979. Because all 
standard lag selection criteria unanimously suggest k = 1 for the US and k = 2 for Germany, 
respectively, we estimate the ARDL model with one lag for the US and two lags for Germany.  
The calculated F-statistics along with some residual diagnostics are reported in Table 1. 
LM(k), k = 1, 3 are Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests for autocorrelation based on k lags, ARCH(k) 
is an LM test for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity, and JB is the Jarque-Bera test for 
normality. Given that all p-values exceed the conventional significance levels, we conclude that 
the residuals do not show any signs of non-normality, autocorrelation or conditional 
heteroscedasticity. Furthermore, the CUSUM of squares tests in Figure 1 indicate that the 
estimated equations are stable. Thus, statistically valid inferences can be drawn regarding the 
cointegration of   and  : because the calculated F-statistics in Table 1 are higher  t Y I ) / ( t Y OFDI ) / (
                                                                                                                                                                                           
number 3 behind the UK. 
  6than the upper bound critical values, we reject the null of no cointegration at the 1% significance 
level.  
 
3.2. Estimating the long-run relationships 
In the next step, we use the Phillips and Loretan (1991) procedure to estimate the long-
run coefficients. This procedure generates asymptotically efficient estimates for variables that 
cointegrate, even with endogenous regressors, by including leads and lags of the first differences 
of the explanatory variables. Moreover, it deals with the autocorrelation of the residuals by 
including lagged values of the stationary deviation from the cointegrating relationship. 
Let   denote the vector   and let  t y ]' ) / ( , , 1 [ t Y OFDI t λ denote the corresponding 
















































' ' ,                          (3)                    
 
where Di,t are impulse dummies. Again, for the US the impulse dummies D75 and D84 are 
introduced. For Germany the dummy variables D76 and D81 are needed in addition to D79. 
Possible reasons for the importance of D76 and D81 are the swift economic recovery in 1976 
after the recessions of 1973-75 and 1981. The Phillips-Loretan Equation is estimated with up to 
two leads and lags (k=2). After applying the general-to-specific approach, we obtain the 
following results (Table 2). 
For the US, the estimated coefficient on  t Y OFDI ) / (  is 4.0588, implying that a one-dollar 
increase in outward investment leads to a four-dollar increase in domestic investment. This is 
very close to the results of Desai et al. (2005), who found that an additional dollar of outward 
investment by US multinational firms is associated with 3.5 dollars of domestic investment (by 
the same multinational firms). In contrast to this, in the case of Germany the coefficient on 
  7t Y OFDI ) / (  has a negative sign. This can be interpreted in the sense that German OFDI is 
crowding out domestic investment activities in the long run. More concretely, the value of 
 implies that total domestic investment decreases by 1.4 dollars due to a one-dollar 
increase in outward direct investment.  
4091 . 1 −
 
3.3. Testing for causality 
However, it remains an open question, whether domestic investment is actually “caused” 
by OFDI. Therefore, in the final step, we test for causality in the sense of Granger (1988). For 















































ec 0491 . 1 5632 . 5 ,                                                                       (5) 
respectively, are entered as error correction terms into an error correction model, in which we 
allow for up to two lags. Table 3 reports the results using the general-to-specific approach. 
As expected, the lagged error correction terms, ect-1, are negative and highly significant, 
which implies co-integration as well as long-run Granger causality from outward to domestic 
investment in both countries (e.g., Granger, 1988). Obviously there are no statistically significant 
short-run effects for the US. For Germany, in contrast, the short-run dynamics are statistically 
significant and positive. Accordingly, in Germany, outward FDI has positive short-run but 
negative long-run effects on domestic investment.  
  8 
3. Conclusions 
 
The empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests that the impact of OFDI on 
domestic investment differs across countries. In the case of the US, OFDI has positive long-run 
effects on domestic investment. Following the explanation by Desai et al. (2005), this estimated 
complementary relationship implies that American multinational firms combine home 
production with foreign production to reduce costs and raise the return to domestic production, 
thus stimulating domestic output and domestic investment. However, for Germany, we find that 
OFDI substitutes for German domestic investment. These differences might be due to differences 
in the overall investment opportunities due to the legal framework. Therefore, a closer look at a 
broader set of indicators and countries using heterogeneous panel techniques might be a natural 
extension of this paper. 
  9 
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         I(0)  I(1)  2 R SE  LM(1) LM(3) Arch(1) Arch(3) JB 
US  1 (OFDI/Y)t, t  b2=b3= 
b4= 0 




















For Germany the relevant critical value bounds are from Pesaran et al. (2001), Table CI(iii) Case III: Unrestricted 
intercept and no trend; for the United States from Table CI(iv) Case IV: Unrestricted intercept and restricted trend. 
*** denote the 1% level of significance.   
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Table 2: 
Long-run relationships: Phillips and Loretan (1991) nonlinear least squares 
Independent variable  United States  Germany 
Constant  7.5449*** (3.89)  5.5632*** (3.06) 





































































































⎛ Δ  
-2.6292** (-2.07)  1.4086** (2.37) 
D75 -3.2960***  (-4.09)   
D76   1.8027**  (2.60) 
D79   2.2796**  (2.43) 
D81   -2.118**  (-2.24) 
D84 2.9480***  (3.73)   
Diagnostic tests     
2 R   0.74 0.83 
LM(1)  0.18 (0.68)  1.24 (0.27) 
Arch(1)  1.97 (0.17)  0.03 (0.87) 
JB  0.17 (0.91)  1.66 (0.44) 
 *** (**) denote the 1% (5%) level of significance. t-statistics are given in parentheses alongside the estimated 
coefficients. Numbers in parentheses alongside the values of the diagnostic test statistics are the corresponding p-
values. 
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Table 3 









⎛ Δ  
Independent variable  United States  Germany 












































─ 0.68**  (2.35) 
1 − t ec   -0.33*** (-4.28)  -0.37*** (-4.53) 
D75 -2.85***  (-3.35)  ─ 
D76  ─  1.46** (2.08)  
D79  ─ 2.49**  (2.75) 
D84 2.99***  (3.51)  ─ 
Diagnostic tests     
2 R   0.52 0.52 
LM(1)  0.04 (0.85)  0.01 (0.91) 
Arch(1)  0.54 (0.47)  0.36 (0.55) 
JB  1.60 (0.45)  0.51 (0.78) 
  *** (**) [*] denote the 1% (5%) [10%] level of significance. t-statistics are given in parentheses alongside the 
estimated coefficients. Numbers in parentheses alongside the values of the diagnostic test statistics are the 
corresponding p-values. 
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